NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

ANDROMACHE 192–204: THE PATTERN OF ARGUMENT

In the prologue Andromache states Hermione's accusation (32–35): "She says that I am making her barren and hateful to her husband with secret drugs, and that I want to dwell in this house in her place (αὐτὴ δὲ ναίειν οἶκον ἀντ' αὐτῆς θέλω / τόνδ'), ejecting her bridal bed by force." And when Hermione appears, she indeed makes just those charges, though in the opposite order (155–58): "You . . . want to occupy this house by expelling me (δόμους κατασχεῖν ἐκβαλοῦσ' ἡμᾶς θέλεις / τούσδε), and I am hated by my husband because of your drugs, and my womb perishes in barrenness because of you." Andromache refutes this accusation directly in the following lines:[1]

εἶπ', ὦ νεᾶνι, τῷ σ' ἐχεγγύῳ λόγῳ
πεισθεῖσ' ἀπωθῶ γνησίων νυμφευμάτων;
ὡς ἡ Λάκαινα τῶν Φρυγῶν μείων πόλις
†τύχῃ θ' ὑπερθεῖ† κἄμ' ἐλευθέραν ὁρᾷς;
ἢ τῷ νέῳ τε καὶ σφριγῶντι σώματι
πόλεως τε μεγέθει καὶ φίλοις ἐπηρμένη
οἶκον κατασχεῖν τὸν σὸν ἀντὶ σοῦ θέλω;
πότερον ἵν' αὐτὴ παῖδας ἀντὶ σοῦ τέκω
δούλους ἐμαυτῇ τ' ἀθλίαν ἐφολκίδα;
ἢ τοὺς ἐμούς τις παῖδας ἐξανέξεται
Φθίας τυράννους ὄντας, ἢν σὺ μὴ τέκῃς;
φιλοῦσι γάρ μ' Ἕλληνες Ἕκτορός γ' ὕπερ;
αὐτή τ' ἀμαυρὰ κοὐ τύραννος ἡ Φρυγῶν;

195 τύχηι MO et$^{l}\Sigma^{mb}$:-η BAVLP et$^{l}\Sigma^{mb}$ ἐλεύθερον BO 197 πόλεως] πλούτου Brunck 203 γ' Jacobs: τ' codd. ὕπερ Dawe: ἄπο codd.

The structure of this argument has long caused difficulties. P. T. Stevens declares: "Rearrangements of these lines to produce a more logical argument, such as those of Bothe and Dobree, are not justified";[2] but this is hardly a wholehearted defense of the transmitted order, and it did not deter P. D. Kovacs from proposing yet another rearrangement.[3] My purpose in this note is to show, first,

1. I give the text of J. Diggle, ed., *Euripidis Fabulae,* vol. 1 (Oxford, 1984), and note a few of the more important variants.

2. *Euripides: "Andromache"* (Oxford, 1971), p. 119. Bothe proposed transposing 197 to precede either 192 or 195. Dobree (*Adversaria Critica*^{2}, vol. 3 [Berlin, 1874], pp. 72–73) proposed—among other things—putting 197 after 193 or rearranging the whole passage in the order 192–93, 199–204, 196–98, 194–95; his last comment on the passage was that the simplest course was to delete 197.

3. *The "Andromache" of Euripides: An Interpretation,* American Classical Studies 6 (Chico, Cal., 1980), pp. 20–28 (repr. from "Three Passages from the *Andromache,*" *HSCP* 81 [1977]: 137–48). Kovacs proposes to cure the passage by deleting 194–95 as an interpolation and inserting 199–200 in their place.

that Andromache's argument is both logical and cogent, and, second, that it follows a simple pattern of rhetorical argument that can be exactly paralleled from the *Palamedes* of Gorgias.

Andromache begins with a question: "Trusting in what secure consideration am I trying to drive you from your legitimate marriage?" We naturally expect a series of suggested answers, each to be refuted explicitly or implicitly; Andromache offers not a single series of suggestions, but two pairs in asyndeton.

The first pair of considerations is introduced by ὡς and takes the form of a disjunctive question. The text of the first limb is obviously corrupt; but though none of the proposed emendations stands out as inevitable,[4] the juxtaposition of "Laconian" and "Phrygian," and the reference to freedom, leave no doubt of the main thrust of the question: "Is it that Troy is greater than Sparta and I am a free woman?" The alternative is that she is "exalted" by her youth and beauty, the greatness of her city, and her high connections. The mention of her city is suspect, since it seems to repeat the point of the previous question. This is perhaps defensible, but it seems more likely that a reminiscence of πόλις in 194 has driven out an example of personal resources; of the various proposals Brunck's πλούτου is perhaps the best.[5] But whether or not we accept this emendation—or another to the same effect—one thing is clear: the considerations that these rhetorical questions imply concern Andromache's ability to supplant Hermoine.[6]

The echoes of πεισθεῖσα and ἀπωθῶ (193) in the ἐπηρμένη and κατασχεῖν θέλω of 197–98 suggest that the argument, having come full circle, is at an end; in fact, the recapitulation of the charge becomes the starting point for the second part of Andromache's argument. Like the first, it is in the form of a disjunctive question: "Is it in order to have children in your place—who will be slaves and a wretched burden to me? Or will anyone put up with my children as princes of Phthia, if you do not have children?" The form of the question is irregular, and Kovacs makes much of this in impugning the transmitted text. It is true that the second limb of a question articulated by πότερον . . . ἤ normally advances a parallel alternative, but Andromache's reason for violating the expected symmetry is obvious. The first motive she suggests—the desire to have children who will be slaves—is inherently absurd. The logical alternative—the desire to have children who will be princes—is not; it is her particular situation that makes it an absurd motive *for her*. But it is rhetorically imperative that the answer to her second question be as self-evident as the answer to her first; she skips over the expected—and hence easily supplied—question to ask another that at once

4. Perhaps the best is Stevens' τύχῃ θ' ὕπερθεν τἄμ' ἐλευθέρων ὁρᾷς; Kovacs' objections to it ("*Andromache,*" p. 21) are of little weight.

5. Kovacs objects ("*Andromache,*" p. 22) that "'size or greatness of wealth' is an odd phrase"; in fact it occurs in Arist. *Pol.* 1311a30 (a reference I owe to one of *CP*'s referees) and, in the plural, in Gorg. *Hel.* 4. This last is a particularly apt parallel, for there wealth is one of the endowments—the others being εὐγένεια, ἀλκή, and σοφία—that explain the ambitions of Helen's suitors.

6. Kovacs objects ("*Andromache,*" p. 27) that if these are what he calls "emboldenments," then θέλω is inexplicable: "For it is nonsense to say that youth, vigor, or city—or anything at all—emboldens someone to *want* to become queen." But clearly the weight of the question in 196–98 falls on the participial phrase (see *HF* 1382–85 for a similar pattern), while the main clause merely restates, and accepts for the sake of argument, the alleged motive.

implies and refutes it. The formal irregularity is a small price to pay for the resulting rhetorical symmetry.

What of the content of the argument? Stevens objects that, in fact, "the birth of other male children to Andromache by Neoptolemus would tend to strengthen her position"; and Kovacs, going even further, declares: "if she succeeds in ousting Hermione . . . , the children she bears to Neoptolemus, while still illegitimate, will be Neoptolemus' only heirs. Far from being a source of misery to her, they will enhance her position."[7] But that is just what Andromache denies, and denies on very convincing grounds. Whatever might be true in the case of other slave-mistresses, her children cannot be Neoptolemus' heirs, because his people will not accept them as their rulers—this point, made in 201–2, is reiterated and elaborated in 203–4. Why this insistence? Surely because to the Athenian audience it is self-evident that if Andromache cannot produce acceptable heirs, she cannot hope to take the place of a legitimate wife.[8] It is this that gives point to the repeated ἀντὶ σοῦ: to take Hermione's place (οἶκον κατασχεῖν . . . ἀντὶ σοῦ)—the motive that Hermione alleges (34–35, 156–57)—is tantamount to bearing children in Hermione's place (αὐτὴ παῖδας ἀντὶ σοῦ τέκω)—which means bearing potential heirs. But Andromache's argument does more than refute the particular motive that Hermione alleges; it shows that there can be no permanent advantage to her in ousting Hermione. For Neoptolemus would still have to contract a legitimate marriage in order to get an acceptable heir, as he has already done once, with the results that are even now unfolding on the stage—results that make nonsense of the claim that having children by Neoptolemus will enhance Andromache's position. If one son did not enhance Andromache's position, why should two, or two dozen? On the contrary, it is clear that the first alternative in this argument, though absurd as a motive, is a real and threatening prospect, for if Andromache's children cannot be princes, they will indeed be, if not strictly speaking slaves, certainly a "wretched burden" to her.[9]

In answer to her initial question Andromache has advanced considerations—λόγοι—of two different orders: in the first argument, considerations of her ability to succeed in the alleged plot against Hermione; in the second, considerations of her ultimate advantage in doing so.[10] By itself this simple logical structure would be enough to defend the passage against any transpositions or deletions; but I think we may go further, and show that the arrangement is very probably a deliberate application of the methods of contemporary rhetoric.[11] It is just this dichotomy of means and motive that structures the main section of

7. Ibid., p. 22.

8. Consider the well-known dictum ([Dem.] 59. 122): "We have hetairai for pleasure, concubines for the daily service of the body, and wives in order to get legitimate children and to have a trustworthy guardian of the household."

9. Stevens calls δούλους a rhetorical exaggeration (*Euripides: "Andromache,"* p. 120), but though in Homeric society (as he notes) the children of a slave concubine were free, it is at least doubtful that the same was true in Athenian society: see A. R. W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens,* vol. 1 (Oxford, 1968), p. 164.

10. This was succinctly stated by Dobree, *Adversaria,* 3:73: "certum est, 194–98. inquiri, *qua fiducia?* 199–204. *quem in finem.*"

11. It would not be the only such application; as Stevens points out (*Euripides: "Andromache,"* pp. 118–19), Andromache's speech begins with a topos frequently found in judicial speeches, and she uses a number of technical legal terms in the course of it.

proof in Gorgias' model of judicial rhetoric, Palamedes' speech in reply to Odysseus' accusation of treason.[12] Palamedes introduces it thus (5): "I shall show in two ways that he does not speak the truth, for neither could I have undertaken such deeds, had I wanted to, nor would I have wanted to, had I been able to." The two sections thus announced each begin and end with further programmatic statements that keep this basic plan before our eyes for nearly half the speech.

Palamedes' method of argument within these two sections is also like Andromache's. The first section of Palamedes' argument (6–12) consists of an apparently exhaustive exposition of the necessary steps in carrying out the alleged treason; each is shown to be impossible, even if, for the sake of argument, the preceding steps are allowed.[13] Palamedes shows that each individual step is impossible by showing that it implies one of several conditions, none of which is possible; the same method—the argument ἐκ διαιρέσεως[14]—structures the second part of the argument (13–21), where Palamedes shows that none of the motives for which one might betray one's country applies to his case. It is important to note that in neither section are the individual arguments restricted to considerations of means or motive; rather, they are all ultimately directed at showing that the alleged treason would have been either impossible or inexpedient. For instance, the first motive Palamedes suggests—the desire for power—is refuted on the grounds, not that he would not have wanted power, but that treason could not have increased his power (13–14). Per se this is an argument about possibility, but its purpose is to show that desire for power cannot have been his motive in committing treason.[15] Similarly, Andromache's argument that her children could not be Neoptolemus' heirs is per se an argument about possibility, but its purpose in its context is to deny a possible motive.

Andromache's whole argument, though much less elaborate than Palamedes', uses the same basic structure and method. I do not of course mean to argue that Euripides is making a deliberate allusion to this particular work of Gorgias, nor even that he was necessarily aware of it.[16] But I would argue that the very explicit way Gorgias' Palamedes uses these patterns shows that they were a recognized part of late fifth-century rhetorical technique, and that it is very likely that Euripides has consciously used them to structure Andromache's defense.

GEORGE H. GOEBEL
Madison, Wisconsin

12. Most recent texts in Diels–Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*[6], vol. 2 (Berlin, 1952), pp. 294–303, and L. Radermacher, "Artium Scriptores (Reste der voraristotelischen Rhetorik)," *SAWW*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, 227.3 (1951): 59–66.

13. This is the basic pattern of Gorgias' *On Being* as well.

14. This is Aristotle's term (*Rh.* 1398a30). Gorgias uses this method also to structure the *Helen*.

15. Such an argument depends of course on the (usually tacit) assumption that the accused would have considered the outcome of the deed as carefully beforehand as he does now for the benefit of the court. Palamedes meets this problem by arguing (25–26): "Only a mad man could ignore the consequences of treason; only a wise man could overcome the practical difficulties in carrying it out. But the same man cannot be both mad and wise."

16. We cannot even be sure that he could have read it. *Andr.* can be dated with some confidence to around 425 (see Stevens, *Euripides: "Andromache,"* pp. 15–19), but any dates for *Pal.* are highly conjectural: it could have been written any time before Gorgias' death early in the fourth century, though it seems a priori unlikely that it is a product of Gorgias' extreme old age.